The financial sector is unique in being largely self-governed: the majority of financial firms' shares are held by other financial institutions. This raises the possibility that monitoring of financial firms is especially undermined by conflicts of interest due to personal and professional links between these firms and their shareholders. To investigate this possibility, we scrutinize the aspect of the financial sector's self-governance that is directly observable: mutual fund companies' voting of their peers' stock. We find that considerations specific to investee firms' membership in the same industry as their investors do indeed impact voting. This impact is in the direction of supporting the investee's management. We extend our analysis to other financial companies and show that they also tend to vote more favorably when it comes to their own industry members. Our results suggest that peer support is a corrupting factor in the financial sector's governance. shareholdings. This means that the financial sector has the distinction of being controlled by shareholders who are its members. If the exercise of voting rights is affected by membership of the same industry, then this should impact the governance of financial firms relative to that of non-financial firms. Specifically, this may lead to voting to undermine one's rivals or to support one's peers. Our paper examines this issue in depth for the only institutional investor category whose voting behavior is consistently observable, namely, mutual funds. In other words, we study whether membership of the same industry as that of the firm they vote on influences mutual fund voting behavior. We find no evidence of competition effects, but we do find evidence of peer support. We additionally examine voting outcomes in the financial sector as a whole, and also find evidence consistent with peer support. Our results have potentially wide-ranging implications for the (self) governance of the finance industry.
1
The financial sector includes institutional investors who dominate corporate shareholdings. This means that the financial sector has the distinction of being controlled by shareholders who are its members. If the exercise of voting rights is affected by membership of the same industry, then this should impact the governance of financial firms relative to that of non-financial firms. Specifically, this may lead to voting to undermine one's rivals or to support one's peers. Our paper examines this issue in depth for the only institutional investor category whose voting behavior is consistently observable, namely, mutual funds. In other words, we study whether membership of the same industry as that of the firm they vote on influences mutual fund voting behavior. We find no evidence of competition effects, but we do find evidence of peer support. We additionally examine voting outcomes in the financial sector as a whole, and also find evidence consistent with peer support. Our results have potentially wide-ranging implications for the (self) governance of the finance industry.
The quality of governance in financial firms has been widely questioned, particularly in the wake of the recent financial crisis. These governance failures have been blamed at least in part on conflicts of interest pertaining to financial institutions as shareholders. For example, a European Commission report on the governance of financial institutions states that "Conflicts of interest apparently arise most often because of lack of sufficient independence of institutional investors or their asset managers within financial groups.
However, conflicts of interest can arise within institutional investors and asset managers too in numbers of ways, for instance on a personal level, as a consequence of the existence of 'old boys' networks'" (European Commission, 2010).
The context of the above quote implies that both firm-level and personal-level conflicts of interest may be particularly common in the governance of financial institutions as compared to that of non-financial firms. This is indeed plausible, since both professional and personal links are more likely to be present when the investor and investee are both financial firms.
1 However, we are not aware of studies that examine such conflicts in the specific context of the financial sector.
The notion that conflicts of interest influence voting by institutional shareholders has received support in the literature. Davis and Kim (2005) , Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2011) and Cvijanovic, Dasgupta, Zachariadis (2013) all examine how mutual fund companies vote on firms to which they provide pension fund services. While Davis and Kim and Ashraf et al. find companies with more pension fund clients vote more with management across the board, Cvijanovic et al. (2013) , re-examine the evidence and conclude that mutual fund companies do vote more with clients during the period the former papers examinedbut not in the subsequent period. Butler and Gurun (2012) examine how fund managers vote on shareholder proposals to limit CEO pay when the fund manager and the CEO are connected through an educational network. They find significant evidence that fund managers vote to limit CEO pay less when both share the same education. Agrawal (2012) studies how labor union pension funds vote and finds that they not only seem to care about the interests of their pension fund clients but also pursue worker interests as well.
Our paper focuses on three types of conflict of interest, each of which is more likely to be present when the firm being voted on is in the finance business than when it is not. The first one is the "old boys' network" effect. Decision-makers at the investing firm are especially likely to be connected to their counterparts at the investee if both have finance backgrounds: they are more likely to have received the same education, to be active in the 1 Consider, for example, the March 31, 2005 re-election of the notoriously combative Lehman CEO Dick Fuld to the company's board. Mr. Fuld's bid received 87.3% investor support only four years before his being ranked as "the worst CEO of all time" by Portfolio magazine (http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2009/04/23/fuld-topsportfolios-worst-ceo-list/). Around two-thirds of Lehman's stock was held by other financial institutions, the top ten being Citigroup, State Street, Barclays, MSDW, Vanguard, AXA, Fisher Investments, MFS, Mellon Bank, and Merrill Lynch. Most of these firms and their managers could be expected to have repeated dealings with Lehman and its management. Mr. Fuld is on record as saying "I want to reach in, rip out their heart, and eat it, before they die" (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZCmWkQuyPc) about his professional adversaries. Voting at Lehman was not confidential, meaning that Lehman's management could find out which shareholders voted for or against any given proposal.
same professional organizations, to have worked at the same organization in their past careers, and to expect to do so in the future. The notion that professional interaction of this kind can influence decision-making has found support in a number of recent papers. For example, Ishii and Xuan (2010) report that targets whose senior management is more connected to their acquirer through educational background and past employment are more likely to retain their CEOs and directors post-merger and for the retained CEOs to be better compensated post-merger, despite low value creation in such acquisitions. As stated earlier, in a context closest to ours, Butler and Gurun (2012) show that mutual funds vote more against proposals to limit CEO pay when the fund manager shares the CEO's educational background.
The second type of conflict of interest between the institutional investor and investee that is more common when the investee is also a financial firm is due to firm-level interaction. The existence of intra-industry competitive effects, whereby one firm's value increasing actions decrease the value of its rivals are well documented, and cover a wide range of firm actions such as new product introductions (Chen, Ho and Ik, 2005) , management forecasts (Kim, Lacina, and Park, 2008) , capital investments (Chen, Ho, and Shih, 2007) , mergers (Becher, Mulherin and Walkling, 2012) , and stock repurchases (Massa, Rehman and Vermaelen, 2007) to name a few. Taken together, this literature implies that when a financial firm votes on an industry rival, it faces a conflict of interest whereby its fiduciary responsibility of increasing the rival firm's value may be at odds with the firm's incentive to undermine the rival. If the peer group is defined broadly enough, however, there could also be supplier and distributor-type links between peer group members.
2 2 Throughout the paper, we refer to the financial sector as a broad grouping of financial services firms that comprises multiple industries (the mutual fund industry, the banking industry, the insurance industry, etc.).
The third type of conflict of interest that is much more likely to be observed between investor and investee when the investee is a financial firm, is due to cross-holdings of shares.
A financial firm may hold shares in its own institutional shareholder, which gives the firm another means of retaliating for any anti-management votes by the shareholder, e.g. by voting against the shareholder's management. Conversely, investor and investee may reciprocate by supporting each other. While tit-for-tat corporate voting has not been studied in the literature, Bang (2010) finds evidence of tit-for-tat compensation when CEOs sit on each other's boards. Cross-shareholdings by institutional investors are also reminiscent of keiretsus, whose members are known to cooperate with each other (Berglöf and Perotti, 1994) . As the extent of cross-shareholdings is much smaller in this context, whether it translates into management-friendly voting remains an empirical issue. Figure 1 shows how the voting interactions we study fit into the overall governance of the finance sector. To a large extent, public companies in the finance sector are held (and therefore governed) by other finance firms -both public and private. Both public and private finance companies get to vote on publicly held finance companies, and this is represented by the grey arrows in the Figure. However, although the public companies themselves generally know how their investors voted, this information is not available to outsiders, except for the aggregate voting outcome. Instead, we can observe voting patterns within a subset of the finance sector: the mutual fund industry. The figure shows that our sample comprises 17 public mutual fund companies that get to vote on each other, as well as 91 private mutual fund companies that get to vote on the public ones.
Using a sample of 8,085 votes cast by these 108 mutual fund companies during 2004-2010, our paper studies whether these conflicts of interest actually influence voting. To compare how mutual fund companies vote on own industry firms as opposed to those from outside their industry we take a sample of within-industry proposals that they vote on and match these to a set of proposals drawn from outside the industry. When we do so, we match on proposal type and on the identity of the voting mutual fund company. We show that mutual fund companies are about 2% more likely to vote with management of firms in their own industry than of firms involved in unrelated activities. We examine reasons why this might be the case by focusing on how mutual fund companies vote on other mutual fund companies.
First, voting appears to be influenced by the fear of retaliation, either in the form of being voted against in the future or being aggressively competed against in the future.
Second, social ties between the voting and target firms increase the voting firm's support for the target's management. Our results suggest that there is "clubbiness" in the way mutual fund companies vote on each other. To generalize our findings, we then examine whether other financial companies apart from mutual fund companies also vote more favorably when it comes to their own industry members and we find evidence that this is the case as well.
Our paper sits at the intersection of the literatures on shareholder voting, the behavior of financial institutions, and competitive interactions between rival firms. Our contribution to the voting literature consists of identifying a novel conflict of interest between the voter and the votee, whereby the two compete in the same product market. 3 Unlike in conflicts of interest studied elsewhere, our conflicted parties are entire organizations rather than their departments/divisions (Davis and Kim, 2005 , Ashraf et al., 2011 and Cvijanovic et al. (2013 or individuals (Butler and Gurun, 2012) within them. This means that the scope for retaliation by the votee and therefore the potential impact on the voting company's behavior is much greater than in cases studied in existing work. This is because in our case retaliation by the votee can take place on multiple fronts such as in the product market, through voting, 3 In the paper we interchangeably use the terms 'voter', 'voting firm' and 'investor' to refer to the party that votes, and we refer to the party being voted on as 'target firm' or 'investee'.
in the labor market, through corporate communication, and through interactions with suppliers. In existing work, on the other hand, retaliation by the votee can take place on one front alone and is therefore bounded in scope. For example in Davis and Kim (2005) , the maximum impact of retaliation by the votee is limited to the loss of the annual management fee paid by the votee's pension plan (the median fee does not exceed $0.2 million).
Alternatively, in Butler and Gurun's setting, any potential retaliation operates via personal relationships between the votee's CEO and the fund manager (even though fund managers often do not make voting decision on their own). The maximum that can be lost, then, is the hypothesized personal relationship between the fund manager and the CEO.
Our contribution to the literature on financial institutions is, first, to identify a new way in which they appear to deviate from their fiduciary duty to clients. Second, and even more importantly, our paper is the first to point out that financial institutions' collective indulging of their industry peers undermines the entire finance industry's governance. Lastly, our paper contributes to our understanding of the scope of interaction among rival firms. It is well known that product market competitors react to each other's actions in adjacent spheres such as recruitment, R&D and advertising. We show, however, that the implications of product market competition can extend as far as such outlying activities as the exercise of corporate governance.
Our paper has the following structure. In Section 1 we present the institutional details relating to voting and develop our hypotheses. In Section 2 we introduce our data. In Section 3 we present our results relating to voting by mutual fund companies and then in Section 4 we extend our findings to voting by all other financial firms. Section 5 presents our robustness tests and Section 6 concludes.
Institutional background and hypotheses

Institutional details
The largest owners of stock in US companies are institutional investors. generally considered on a case-by-case basis. Each mutual fund that the fund company manages gets to vote on the shares it owns. In many companies voting is centralized, while in others fund managers may be given more freedom as to how they vote. Recent work by Morgan et al. (2011) has shown that there may be greater differences in the way different funds within a family vote for shareholder proposals than for management proposals. As there are far fewer shareholder proposals than management proposals and because of their greater heterogeneity we focus in this study on management proposals alone. When we do include shareholder proposals as well in our analysis this has little meaningful effect on our results.
Our aim is to understand whether being in the same business makes mutual fund companies vote differently on each other as opposed to how they vote on other firms. In order to examine whether mutual funds vote differently in the presence of conflicts of interest, we need a benchmark that defines what "differently" means. Throughout this paper, we will use the target firm management's voting recommendation as such a benchmark.
Hypotheses
We are interested in whether mutual fund companies vote differently on their rivals as opposed to any other firm. We propose two competing hypotheses that might drive voting behavior.
The first hypothesis is the rivalry hypothesis. Voting mutual fund companies see the target mutual fund companies being their rivals and their prime concern is inhibiting the conduct of business of these competitors. In this case, we would expect mutual fund companies to vote more against the management of rival mutual fund companies as compared to how they would vote on any other firm.
The second hypothesis is the clubbiness hypothesis. In this case, mutual fund companies support target mutual fund companies more than other firms. 
Data
We obtain our voting data from the voting analytics database by ISS who collects mutual fund company voting data from mutual funds' form NP-X annual submissions. [ Table 1] Mutual fund companies, which are often referred to as mutual fund families in the literature, manage collections of mutual funds. Our aim is to understand how these mutual fund companies (MFCs) vote when they hold stock in other mutual fund companies. While the target company whose proposal is being voted on is of course listed, the voting company could be either public or private. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the number and size of the target mutual fund companies in our sample. In addition, the table presents statistics on the public versus private mix and the number of funds of companies that invested in these target mutual fund companies in our sample.
Our sample contains 17 public mutual fund companies that may vote and be voted on and 91 private mutual fund companies that vote on the public companies but are not voted on.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 . When we focus on voting by public firms only, our sample comprises 61 distinct voter-votee pairs, representing 1279 voting decisions. When we study voting by both public and private firms, our sample grows to 366 distinct voter-votee pairs, representing 8085 voting decisions. Appendix A presents a list of mutual fund companies contained in our sample for each category.
To understand how mutual fund companies vote on each other, we need to aggregate the ISS data to the fund family level. We do so using the approach taken by both Davis and Kim (2007) and Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2012) , and we register the fund family as supporting a proposal if the majority of its funds support a particular proposal. Specifically, we compute the percentage support by a fund family on a given proposal by dividing the total number of funds within the fund family that vote for a proposal by the total number of funds in the family that vote on the proposal. We then create a dummy variable that equals one if the majority of the funds in a fund family support a proposal and zero otherwise.
[ Table 2 ] shares. We report this variable as "holding stake" in Table 2 , and it can be seen from the table that the average holding stake is around a fifth of one percent.
In our sample, the fraction of voting stocks held in the investing mutual fund company by the target mutual fund company (which we call 'reciprocal stake') has a median of 0.3%
and is on average 0.65% indicating that it is right skewed. 4 The dollar value of cross holdings can be large, and in our dataset the largest cross holding is $678 million by BlackRock in Franklin Resources in December 2009.
[ Table 3 ] 
Empirical analyses on voting by mutual fund companies
In the first part of this section we report on our investigation into how mutual fund companies vote on own industry firms as compared to how they vote on firms from other industries. In the second part we zoom in on voting within the mutual fund industry which allows us to model the interactions between mutual fund companies in greater detail.
Summary statistics of votes cast by mutual fund companies
[ Table 4 ]
To begin, we present summary statistics on how mutual fund companies voted across all industries, including their own. These statistics are presented in Table 4 . Between 2004 and 2010, 8,085 votes were cast by mutual fund companies on other mutual fund companies.
Of these votes, 92.6% were cast with management. At the same time, approximately 5.9 million votes were cast by mutual fund companies on firms outside their industry, 90.9% of these votes being with management. Our summary statistics suggest at first pass that mutual fund companies vote more frequently with management in their own industry. However, these results do not control for other influences on the voting decision.
Cross industry results
Our aim is to compare the intensity with which mutual fund companies vote in favor of management on own industry members versus on members of other industries. In Table 5 , we model the decision to vote with management using an indicator variable that equals one if a given mutual fund company votes in favor of management. As the dependent variable in this regression is a categorical variable we take a logit regression approach.
Many mutual fund companies have company-level voting guidelines for each proposal type and therefore, in our logit regressions, we use fixed effects for voting company/proposal type combinations. To control for time variation in voting behavior we also include year fixed effects. All our standard errors are clustered by proposal and year to allow for correlation in voting behavior between different mutual fund companies for a particular proposal in a given year.
To determine our final sample, we use a matching approach that is based on voting company and proposal type. We have 8,085 observations of mutual fund votes on other mutual fund companies. For each of these votes by mutual fund company (i) on proposal type (j) on mutual fund company (k) we match it to a vote by the same mutual fund company (i) on the same proposal time type (j) but on a company that is outside the mutual fund industry and is closest in size to the original mutual fund company (k). The matching procedure helps us ensure that these characteristics do not explain differences in voting behavior.
To explain the decision to vote with management we use a number of independent control variables plus a dummy variable own industry (0,1) that equals one if the company whose proposal is being voted on is from the mutual fund industry as well. As a mutual fund company is more likely to vote for management if ISS supports management we include a dummy variable ISS=management (0,1). The impact of the ISS recommendation on the way mutual fund companies vote may be different if the recommendation relates to own industry companies as opposed to other firms. This is because one might expect mutual fund companies to believe that they have a richer information set when it comes to their own industry investments and therefore to pay less heed to the ISS recommendation in these cases.
Due to this, we interact ISS=management (0,1) with own industry (0,1) to allow for this possibility.
We also include the variable holding stake which measures how much the voting mutual fund company has invested in the target. We would expect that if the voting mutual fund company has a larger amount invested in the target, it is more optimistic about the future performance of the target and hence is more likely to agree with the actions of management.
The size of the target and voting firm may have a bearing on voting behavior. As all target firms are public, we control for the size of target firms by including the natural logarithm of the target firm's market value of assets in the regressions. As a substantial fraction of voting firms are private, we control for their scale in our regressions by including the natural logarithm of the number of funds that are run by each voting firm as an explanatory variable in our regressions.
Hong (2005) shows evidence of word-of-mouth effects among institutional money managers. As these word-of-mouth effects are more likely to arise if money managers are physically close, we include the dummy variable closeness (0,1), which is set to unity if the distance between the voting company and the target is less than 100 miles and to zero otherwise. This is in order to capture the fact that interaction between the target and voting firm is more likely if the two are geographically close.
[ Table 5 ]
The results of our cross industry regressions are presented in Table 5 . The main independent variable of interest is own industry (0,1) which tells us whether mutual fund companies vote differently on own industry targets. Across specifications, own industry (0,1)
is significantly positive, which suggests that mutual fund companies are biased when it comes to voting on own industry members. The marginal effect of the own industry dummy on the propensity to vote with management is 1.7%. 5 Given that the percentage of "for" votes in the bottom and the top quartile of proposals is 95.78% and 99.03% respectively, this effect represents more than half of the interquartile range in the propensity to vote with management across all proposals. Such an increase can also have important governance implications. For example, Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) show that, even though the vast majority of board members are elected with over 90% shareholder support, "a 1% decrease in the compensation committee chair votes is associated with a reduction in unexplained CEO compensation by approximately $220,000 in the following year." A plausible reason why a small absolute increase in the proportion of against-management votes can have a significant effect has to do with the fact that proposal support is made public and gives a measure of investor discontent. This means that relative differences in investor disapproval across companies or circumstances may be more important than such absolute differences. In our case, the 1.7% lower disapproval within the fund management industry as compared to 9.5% outside the industry translates into an impressive 1.7%/9.5%=17.8% reduction in the level of publicly visible investor support.
As expected, mutual fund companies vote more with management when ISS and management agree and the marginal effect of ISS agreeing with management on the propensity to vote with management is 48.9%. We also find that the influence of the ISS recommendation is lesser when the firm being voted on is an own industry company. This corroborates our expectation that mutual fund companies might discount the ISS recommendation more when it comes to own industry members due to their belief that they know better. Larger voting firms vote more with the management of the target which may be because larger voting firms are typically public and these firms may be voted against by the target in the future. The marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in this variable on the propensity to vote with management is only 0.72% however.
The voting company / proposal type combination fixed effects are statistically significant in most cases. For example, in model (1), 95% of the fixed effects are significant at the 5% level or below. This confirms the value of including fixed effects in this format in our regressions.
Overall, the evidence presented in our cross industry analysis suggests that clubbiness rather than rivalry is at work when it comes to how mutual fund companies vote on their rivals. In the next within-industry analysis section, we try to understand why this is the case.
Within industry results
We now focus on the behavior of mutual fund companies when voting on own industry members only. We start by discussing potential influences on the voting decision in this context. First, consider the threat of retaliation. If the management of the target is voted against, they may retaliate by voting against the voting company in the future. Alternatively as the target and the voting company both originate from the same sector, the target can seek to retaliate against the voting company in the marketplace that they both compete within.
To proxy for these retaliation possibilities in our within industry analyses, we proceed as follows. In the case of voting retaliation, as this is only possible if the voting company is public, we include a public voting company dummy. We would expect public voting companies to vote more generously towards management because of the fear of future retaliation. As the potential for retaliation by the target in the future is increasing in the stake the target has in the voting company, we also include this variable in our within industry analysis and label it reciprocal stake. As the threat of marketplace retaliation by the target is greater the closer the voting company and target company compete, we include a measure of the degree to which two companies compete labeled competitive threat in our analysis.
"Competitive threat" captures the extent to which the target company's fund offerings overlap with those of the voting company and hence pose a threat to its revenues. For each Lipper sector that both voting and target MFCs have funds in, the measure involves calculating the product of two variables. 6 The first is the proportion of the voting MFC's assets under management in that sector which is indicative of how important the sector is for the revenues of the voting MFC, and the second is the target MFC's market share in that objective, which measures the threat posed by the target to the voting firm's revenues in that sector. The product of these two variables is then summed across Lipper objectives to generate our "competitive threat" variable.
7,8
The voting company's behavior today may also be influenced by its past actions. In particular, if the target was friendly towards the voting company in the past, this may be reciprocated by the voting company this time around. To allow for this possibility, we include the variable friendly target in our regressions which captures the percentage of the time that the target voted with the management of the voting company in the last voting season. When considering how same industry companies vote on each other, there are also two additional influences on their voting behavior that stem from these companies being similar entities. First, they share common information. Second, they have common interests.
To capture the degree to which mutual fund companies have common information in our 6 Our measure is inspired by the competitiveness measure used by Wahal and Wang (2011), which, for all stocks held by an incumbent fund, divides the sum of the entrant fund's holdings in these stocks by the fund's total holdings. If we were to simply translate the Wahal and Wang measure into our setting, then a voted-on family with a large presence in just one of the objectives that the voting family has a presence in, could be considered a significant competitive threat to the voting family even if the importance of that objective to the voting family is minimal.
7 As a numerical example, if the voting company has 5% of its assets in sector one, 15% of its assets in sector 2, and 80% of its assets in sector three and the target has a market share in sector one, two and three of 3%, 5%, and 10% respectively then the competitive threat posed to the voting company by the target being voted on is equal to (for sector one) 0.05x0.03+ (for sector two) 0.15x0.05+ (for sector three) 0.8x 0.1= 0.089. 8 One concern is that the competitive threat variable is simply a proxy for the sizes of the voting and target companies. However, this is not the case. The correlation between this variable and the size of the target company is 0.0704. Using the number of funds managed by the voting company as a measure of its scale, the correlation between the competitive threat and scale of the voting company is -0.0662.
analysis, we measure how frequently they vote together on third parties (common information). We measure common interest when it comes to a given proposal by measuring whether today's voting company tabled a similar proposal last period.
9
We would expect firms from the same industry to have senior employees that share social ties. Voting firms that have stronger social ties with target firms can be expected to vote with the management of the target. In order to measure these ties we conduct a point-topoint analysis between voting and target firms using the BoardEx dataset which allows us to identify all the connections between senior executives and board members of any two companies. BoardEx defines social ties as an overlap in employment, board membership, education or social activities of two firms' board members and top managers. We include a dummy variable social ties (0,1) if there is any connection between the target and voting company in our dataset.
10
For our within industry analysis we not only include the above variables but we also add the same variables that we used to explain voting behavior in the cross industry analysis.
We first run our regressions for the full sample where both public and private voting firms vote on own industry targets. We then run our within industry regressions using public voting firms only.
[ Table 6 ]
The results of our regressions using the full sample of 8,085 votes by all voting firms are presented in the first three columns of Table 6 . The first thing to note is that public voting firm (0,1) is positive and significant, which suggests that the threat of voting retaliation leads 9 Certain variables namely friendly target, reciprocal stake and common interest can only be constructed if the firm doing the voting this period is public and therefore can be voted on. 10 We do not include social ties as a variable in our cross industry regressions. Measured social ties are likely to be high when firms are from the same industry and low otherwise and so will have two measured levels like the own industry dummy depending on whether firms are from the same industry or not. As a result both the own industry dummy and any social ties variable will behave like each other meaning there is little benefit in including both variables in our cross industry regressions.
to the voting company voting more sympathetically with the management of the target. The marginal effect of the public voting firm dummy is a change in the probability of voting for management of 14.45%. This suggests that the threat of being voted against has a substantial effect on the propensity to vote with management.
Apart from retaliation via voting, the possibility of retaliation in the marketplace also appears to be a determinant of voting behavior, as competitive threat is highly significant across specifications. This supports the notion that mutual fund companies are less likely to vote against the management of closer competitors out of concern about the potential damage these competitors inflict in return. While competitive threat is statistically significant, its economic impact is small for the full sample and the marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in competitive threat on the probability of voting and management is only 0.36%.
For the own industry sample, the impact of ISS agreeing with management on the propensity to vote has a marginal effect of 22.16%. The marginal effect of ISS recommendations within industry is therefore less than half of the marginal effect across all industries. This is consistent with our conjecture that ISS recommendations are given less weight when they concern own industry members. In addition, common information, which captures the information overlap between the voting firm and the target, is positively statistically significant. This indicates that the voting firm is more likely to vote with the management of the target when the voting firm and target are more closely aligned from an information perspective.
Since we can only observe friendly target, reciprocal stake, common interest and social ties 11 if the voting firm is public and therefore can be voted on, we now examine the effect of these variables on the propensity to vote with management using the 1,279 votes by public voting firms. We present our regressions including these additional variables in the last four columns of Table 6 .
Our regression results show that for this sample of votes cast by public mutual fund companies, competitive threat has an economically much more substantial role to play and its marginal effect on the probability to vote with management is 8.58%. Friendly target is also economically important with a marginal effect on the probability to vote with management of 11.12%. In addition, the marginal propensity to vote with management increases by 9.98% occasions that we find evidence of tit-for-tat behavior appears to be consistent with mutual fund companies supporting each other in our dataset.
Further voting evidence on other types of financial institutions
We have used data on mutual fund voting to test whether there is evidence of conflicts of interest in the way mutual fund companies vote on corporate proposals. Our results show that mutual fund companies vote more sympathetically towards other mutual fund companies.
This tells us that these companies may be unable to provide effective corporate governance especially when it comes to governance over their own industry members. If the governance of mutual fund companies is compromised by the fact that much of their equity is held by industry peers, is a similar concern warranted in the case of banks and insurers?
Although data on how these other types of financial institutions vote is unavailable,
we have three pieces of information that allow us to shed light on whether the selfgovernance for the financial sector as a whole is compromised. First, for each proposal, we know the proportion of votes that support management. Second, we know if the target is a financial company or not. Third, we can calculate what proportion of the target is held by banks, insurers and investment managers. This data is available from the 13F holdings database.
With this information, we run the following regression across all proposals in our sample. In addition, we include a confidential voting dummy that is set to one if the company being voted on has adopted confidential voting, which means that its management cannot see how its shareholders voted on it. If shareholders are worried about retaliation as is suggested by our previous analysis then we would expect that they would vote more against management in the case of confidential voting as in this case there is no chance of retaliation.
Proportion of votes in favor of management of company (i) = intercept
We did not include confidential voting in our prior mutual fund-level analyses so far as mutual fund voting is public information and therefore the issue of confidential voting is not relevant.
To the regression we add a number of control variables including the size of the target company being voted on, the industry adjusted return of the target in the previous 12 months.
To capture the geographic position of the target in relation to the voting company, we include a dummy variable if the target is from New York City as many financial companies in our sample are from the New York City area. 12 We also include proposal type and time fixed effects. As our observations in this test are at the proposal level, not the vote level, we cluster our standard errors by proposal type and year. The results of our regression are presented in Table 7 .
[ Table 7 ]
We find that the loading on the interaction between the financial dummy and the proportion of the firm that is financial is positive and significant. The marginal effect associated with this interaction variable is 2.30%. This tells us that it is not only mutual fund companies that are biased towards their own industry members when it comes to voting. In fact, all financial companies taken together vote more with the management of companies they are voting on if they are also from the financial sector. In addition, we find that the coefficient on the confidential vote dummy is negative and significant which indicates that there is less support management when votes are not seen by it. These results together with the results from the prior section on mutual fund companies tell us that the financial sector as a whole faces own industry bias when it comes to voting on its own kind. As financial companies hold a large fraction of US equity, own industry bias may have a substantial detrimental effect on the corporate governance of US financial stocks.
Robustness
In this section, we perform a number of tests to examine the robustness of our findings reported in the previous sections.
Uncontentious votes
It might be argued that if voting parties see the voting outcome as being a foregone conclusion, this may affect their level of engagement with the voting process. For example, if they do not bother to invest time into voting then they may consider the easiest choice as being simply voting with management. To investigate this further, we exclude votes that are perceived likely to be passed by the voting parties. To proxy for this, we use the actual vote outcome and assume that if the pass rate was sufficiently high that the voting parties would have judged the voting outcome as being a foregone conclusion. When we exclude 6774
votes with a pass rate of more than 95%, our results continue to hold. Specifically, in Table 6 model (4), the coefficients for the competitive threat and collusion variable are 64.68 and 32.53 and are significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. When we drop 7366 votes with a pass rate of more than 90%, the coefficients for these two variables become significant at the 1% level.
Non-mutual fund votes
If the way mutual funds vote is affected by their beliefs regarding how other parties will vote then this may condition their propensity to vote with management. Naturally we are unable to observe the beliefs of mutual fund companies regarding how they view the likelihood that other parties will vote with management. We use the actual way that all other parties voted to proxy for these beliefs and include this information as a control variable in our tests. For the cross industry regression, doing so has the additional advantage that if the corporate governance quality of mutual fund companies is in some way different from that of all other companies then including how other parties vote will control for this. When we include this variable in both our within industry and across industry tests, we find that this variable is insignificant at conventional levels and our results remain unaffected.
Clustered standard errors
In all tests presented in the paper, we cluster our standard errors by proposal. This assumes that the errors are correlated across mutual fund companies for the same proposal.
For example, if all mutual fund companies are voting on amending an omnibus stock plan for BlackRock, then we assume that the way they vote will be correlated. We also cluster by proposal type instead of proposal, which assumes that the errors are correlated for a given proposal type rather than a specific proposal. For example, if all mutual fund companies are voting on amending any omnibus stock plan then we assume that the way they vote will be correlated. All of our results continue to hold if we cluster the standard errors by proposal type.
Conclusion
The recent financial crisis has been blamed in part on the poor governance of the financial sector. The main owners of financial company stocks are other financial institutions, which collectively makes the financial sector responsible for its own governance.
Are financial firms able to perform this self-governance function in accordance with their fiduciary duty or are they swayed by their self-interests? This is the question that we seek to address in this paper. As shareholder voting is an important part of the governance process and voting is not observable for other types of financial institution, we use the testing ground of mutual fund voting to do so.
When we compare how mutual fund companies vote on other mutual fund companies with how they vote on firms from outside their own industry we find evidence that they vote more in favor of own industry members. To understand why this is the case we focus on what determines how mutual fund companies vote on each other. We find that fear of retaliation and the level of social ties have an important bearing on how these companies 26 vote. To generalize our findings, we then examine whether other financial companies apart from mutual fund companies also vote more favorably when it comes to their own industry members and find evidence that banks also favor their own industry members. Overall our results suggest that there are limitations in the finance industry's ability to govern itself. As concerns over retaliation appear to be driving this result, this is an argument in favor of requiring financial firms to adopt confidential voting.
In spite of intense interest in decision-making within the financial sector, we are not aware of other research into the role of what amounts to the sector's self-governance. The present paper is a first step in this regard. While we focus on shareholder voting, governance can of course be exercised through a variety of formal and informal channels. We believe that financial firms' uniqueness in that their shares are largely in the hands of peer firms is an intriguing and important point of departure for understanding financial firms' governance. Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2011) . We compute the percentage support by a fund family on a given proposal by dividing the total number of funds within the fund family that vote for a proposal by the total number of funds in the family that vote on the proposal. We then create a dummy variable that equals one if the majority of the funds in a fund family support a proposal (vote with management) and zero otherwise. Table 4 Vote outcome on proposals voted at mutual fund companies vs. non mutual fund companies Table 6 The probability of voting with target management's recommendation within the mutual fund industry
In this table, we run logistic regressions modeling the probability of investing MFCs voting with target MFC management recommendations during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The dependent variable is one if the majority of funds within a family vote with the target MFC management recommendation. Competitive threat captures the extent to which the target MFC overlaps with the voting MFC across mutual fund objectives, using the Lipper classification. To calculate this variable, we multiply the proportion of the investing MFC's TNA in a given objective by the target MFC's market share in that objective, and sum across objectives that the investing MFC has funds in. Closeness (0,1) equals one if the distance between headquarters of the voting MFC and target MFC is less than 100 miles. Public voting firm (0,1) equals one if the voting firm is publicly traded. Collusion is the proportion of time that the target company votes with management recommendation of the voting company in the last voting season. Reciprocal stake is the percentage of sole voting authority shares (out of the total number of shares outstanding) of the investing MFC held by the target MFC. Table 7 Voting evidence on other types of financial institutions
In this regression, we take all the proposals in our sample and regress the log-odds proportion of votes in favor of management for each stock being voted on the following key independent variables: (i) Financial sector holding proportions of the stock; (ii) Financial sector dummy variable indicating whether the stock concerned is a financial firm; (iii) Interaction between the financial sector (0,1) and its holding proportion. We cluster standard errors by proposal type and year and report p-values in parentheses. The symbols * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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